INTRODUCTION
"In heart I am a Moslem (sic); in heart I am an American; in heart I am Moslem, in heart I'm an American artist…", so said Patti Smith. This was way back before the Islamic Revolution, before the Rushdie affair, before Affair Foulard, before the murder of Theo van Gogh, before the Danish cartoon affair, and of course, before the war on terror. It is increasingly difficult to imagine, from today"s perspective, how it would be possible to establish equivalence between American, Muslim and Art. Does not America and Muslim signify opposition between Western and non-Western and does not antagonism between Art and Muslim represent a deep antagonism between rigid orthodoxy and enlightened self-expression? Since at least the 1990s, there has been a huge growth in interest about the Muslim presence in Western plutocracies.
Part of this interest has been due to series of moral panics, as noted above. What unifies these moral panics -despite their local contexts and specific histories -is the way in which mobilization of Muslim identity has raised questions about national identity and belonging. Increasing interest is also due to the way in which the security threat -as posited by the "war on terror" -has been focused on the Muslim question is being contested around the figure of the Muslim. The metaphorical excess of "Muslim" and "Western" points to the politicization of these labels, since they operate as surfaces of inscription for a wide range of demands and mobilizations that are not reducible to the facticity of being Western or being Muslim. Islam and the West become the names of antagonistic global projects which increasingly polarize the world and its history. It is in this context that the presence of ethnically marked populations in the European Union, which increasingly define themselves and are defined by others as being Muslim, assume a critical importance.
The regulation and disciplining of Muslim-ness has become a mechanism by which the state authorities have been able to introduce measures which seemingly threaten to roll back many of the cherished democratic institutions and practices of civil society. As William Connolly (2005: 6) writes:
The cold war generated McCarthyism as an extreme response to the threats that the Soviet Union posed to Christian faith and capitalism together. The terrorism of AlQaeda, in turn, generates new fears, hostilities, and priorities. The McCarthyism of our day, if it arrives, will connect internal state security to an exclusionary version of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Thus the Muslim question is not only of importance for ethnographers, urban planners, and local government officials; it is currently at the heart of the debates about the nature of European-ness itself.
On the one hand, it is assumed that the presence of so many Muslims in the urban heart of the European Union subverts the binary opposition between Islam and the West. On the other hand, it is argued that the persistence of Muslims in Europe constitutes one of the gravest threats to European societies and cultures -in that it provides the sea in which the jihadist infiltration of Europe can proceed. (Thomson, 2006) . For the most part, depictions of Muslims in Europe (including official, journalistic, academic and popular) are represented in terms of an "immigrant imaginary" (Sayyid, 2004; Hesse and Sayyid, 2006) . This immigrant imaginary provides a reservoir of highly mobile tropes which have been used over time to mark out various groups of ex-colonial and ethnically marked settlers.
THE IMMIGRANT IMAGINARY
The immigrant imaginary is a series of identifications by which the emergence of their everyday conduct is different from that of "normal people." Whereas the host society has networks, immigrants have kinship; whereas the host society has modernity, the immigrants are tradition-bound. Or, for example, consider the way in which "settler" communities have too often been considered to be outside the pale of proper politics. It is thought that their activities can be explained in terms of "factionalism" or machinations of egotistical community leaders. hybridized member of the host community, i.e. adding colour and cuisine to the host society). Whatever route they take, these immigrants will find that all roads lead to their eventual elimination as distinct populations. Furthermore, the act of consumption by the host will not substantively transform the host -the host remains the same. It is the immigrants who are chewed up and digested. This trope manifests itself in the speeches of politicians and the commentaries of opinion-makers as exhortations to immigrants to speed up the process of assimilation by eliminating whatever practice is considered to be the current cause of moral panics -e.g. arranged marriages, "matriarchal" households, cultural schizophrenia, or youth delinquency.
Secondly
Fourthly, the form of this integration can be represented in discrete and successive stages called generations. A generation is one of the key units of analysis in this type of narrative. Generations are considered to be permanent units by which the immigration experience can be accounted for while continuing to maintain the status of immigrants. Generational differences are articulated as the crystallization of changes that immigrants are supposed to go through over time. Each generation marks the progress towards integration into the host community. The immigrant imaginary presents a picture analogous to the way in which tadpoles are transformed over time into full-grown frogs. The use of the concept of generations within the immigrant imaginary performs two functions. First, it prevents the completion of the process of immigration. The prefixing of "first", "second" or "third" to generation defers the moment when the immigrants can be considered settlers, i.e. fully part of the society in which they reside. The ethnically marked ex-colonial settlers become permanent immigrants. This act of freezing the immigrant to the moment at which he or she gets off the plane (or boat) has the effect of reinforcing the essentialization of the immigrant, since, regardless of how many generations have passed, the immigrant remains an immigrant, and the process of immigration remains without an end. Thus, the moment of assimilation is continually deferred, and the immigrants" relationship to the society in which they reside, remains that of newcomers. Second, the concept of generation works to de-historicize "immigrants", to remove them from the currents of history, and thus excludes any political aspects of the "immigrant"
experience. "Generations" is deployed as a temporal category that removes any political dimension from causal explanations. In other words, time is spatialized through the notion of generation. So the differences between the "first" generation and "second" generation are narrated as being due to the differences in assimilation into the host society and not as changes in historical context. The immigrant, over time, is to be transformed into a member of the host society (but, as was pointed out above, the transformation is never complete and constantly deferred).
The immigrant imaginary has a wide circulation both in academic and popular culture. It provides the tools by which the identity of "immigrants" can be regulated and as such no Western government could ever accommodate them. These included, and hence precluded any compromise on, the defence of freedom of speech, of gender equality, and opposition to the shariah law and to the establishment of the caliphate.
gender equality is open to qualification on account of the fact that freedom of speech is restricted not only through legislation (e.g. Holocaust denial), but also through "sociological" factors, such as oligopolistic control of media. Similarly, gender equality is also undermined by various cultural factors. Nor is it clear that the distinction between Islamists and others can be organized in terms of the opposition or acceptance of freedom of speech or gender equality. The attempt to intimidate AlJazeera, or legislation introduced in the UK against the "glorification of terrorism", all point to the far more complicated positions in which the trope of "freedom of speech"
operates in the age of the "war against terror". As for gender equality, the institutionalized gender apartheid of Saudi Arabia has never been a significant hindrance to the description of the Saudi regime as moderate. Gender equality becomes, rather, a means of legitimating post-colonial "humanitarian" interventions (Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002) .
The arguments for a European Islam, however, neglect the persistence of Orientalism and instead focus on "progressive, modern values" embedded in there can be no scientific progress, and without scientific progress there could be no technological advances. In this sense, secularism as an epistemological category rather than a social one can be described as denoting a shift from an episteme 34 For details of this argument see Sayyid, 2009. centred on God to one centred on Man (sic). The core of the argument is that secularism de-legitimates the claims of religious authorities to control the production of knowledge, and creates the conditions for the rejection of ontological claims founded on sacred narratives in favour of a scientifically approved ontology.
-Secularism is necessary to ensure civic peace and social harmony and to prevent religious passions from getting out of hand. By separating religion and confining it to the private sphere, secularism prevents differences in religious opinions from becoming the source of conflicts that would engulf a society"s public space. Religious differences become matters of individual taste and therefore have little impact upon the organisation of social life at large. In addition, secularism prevents contending groups from making appeals to supernatural forces as a way of reinforcing their positions and keeps all parties on an even playing field in which debate cannot be short-circuited by such appeals.
-Secularism presents the necessary pre-condition for the exercise of democracy -which, following Lefort"s useful understanding, is based on keeping the space of power empty (1986: 279). The removal of God allows the space of power to be emptied. The claim being that democracy is a government that is ultimately based on the idea of the "sovereignty of the people", regardless of how this idea is expressed in reality (e.g. in Britain, it is the parliament which is sovereign not the people; however, the power of parliament derives from the people). Popular sovereignty seems to preclude any place for the idea of a sovereign God or sovereign priesthood. Thus the benefits of secularism help to define modernity itself. Modernity, of course, remains a narrative about Western exceptionality (Sayyid, 2003: 101-102) , and thus secularism becomes a marker of Western identity. The epistemological, civic and democratic arguments for secularism are formulated as part of a narrative of Western exceptionally.
European Islam is an Islam that can be accommodated within the Western notions of secularism and its presumed benefits. Specifically, the applicability of the three main arguments for secularism and their relevance for Muslims can be challenged by focusing on the experience of autonomous Islamicate cultural formations -that is, those cultural formations that existed prior to the colonial enframing of the planet. In other words, the shift from Western to Islamicate societies seemingly undermines the universal claims for secularism.
So, for example, the idea of an epistemological case for secularism rests upon a conflict between science and church -a conflict that is often symbolized by the trial of Galileo. But the absence of an organized Church, made such clear demarcations between authority of religion and science difficult to draw within Islamicate societies.
Perhaps more importantly, the epistemological case for the benefits of secularism is based on the assumption that the understanding of the Divine in Islamic and Nasrani discourses is homologous. In the Christological conception of Divine, the Man (sic) and God occupy the same ontological plane, thus human endeavour can potentially compete with the Divine. The conjoining of human and divine spheres -as described through the category of incarnation in which divine and mundane fuse in the body of Christ -no doubt helps to sustain a perspective in which human and divine exist in the same dimension. Thus narratives of divine causality and intervention are locked in a zero-sum game with narratives that centre on human agency. As a consequence, science and religion continually collide within Nasrani discourses.
Within Islamic interpretations the divide between Divine and human cannot be The argument that secularism is a necessary pre-condition of any political system of popular sovereignty ignores the possible ways in which popular sovereignty can be finessed, from the example of various constitutional monarchies to the suggestion by Mawdudi and others who re-described popular will as being vice regal rather than sovereign. In other words, the sovereignty of the Divine is an elaboration of the centrality of God to the cosmos but cannot be practical sovereignty in the formulation suggested by Carl Schmitt ("the sovereign is who decides upon the exception") if for no other reason than that the idea of a monotheistic version of the omnipotent and omniscient God does not allow for the Divine to have any exception.
It would seem that the meaning of secularism is perhaps to be found in attaching and articulating very different historical developments to the Plato-to-NATO sequence that encapsulates Westernese. The articulation of a global Muslim subjectivity, by threatening to reveal Plato-to-NATO as historiographical convention rather than history, contributes to the provincialization of Europe"s final vocabulary. In the context of Muslims living in Western plutocracies the staples of the "immigrant imaginary" becomes strained, as categories such as religion, minority, "race" and others are seen more and more as part of the Plato-to-NATO sequence. The validity of this sequence rests upon the exercise of coloniality. Around this narration and constant re-narration of this sequence a community becomes sedimented. The Muslim Ummah, like other major historical communities, is able to generate the universal from the cultivation of its "own" language games. It
is not clear what the articulation of a European Islam would achieve apart from maintaining and reinforcing the frontier between Europeaness and NonEuropeaness, since a European Islam to be viable would have to be distinguished from a non-European Islam. As it has been pointed, the "violent hierarchy" between Europeaness and non-Europeaness is constitutive of Western racism (Hesse and Sayyid, forthcoming) .
